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Provable Time and Place of Capture for Photos 
ABSTRACT 
Photographs can be manipulated or decontextualized to mislead or misrepresent. Existing 
techniques to authenticate the time or location of image capture, such as stamping a time on the 
image, are rather simplistic and vulnerable. This disclosure describes techniques to prove the 
time and place of capture of a photograph. An authenticity server generates a timestamped, 
pseudorandom pattern. Upon capture of a photograph, the camera downloads the pattern and 
captures an authentication video while executing a sequence of movements corresponding to the 
pattern. The authentication video can be used to authenticate the time of capture of the 
photograph by confirming that the camera moved in accordance with the timestamped, 
pseudorandom pattern. 
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BACKGROUND 
It is not too difficult to manipulate or decontextualize an image to mislead or 
misrepresent [1]. Such manipulations can damage reputation, public opinion, etc. Existing 
techniques to pinpoint the time or location of image capture, such as stamping a time on the 
image [2], are rather simplistic and vulnerable. Some processes [3] amount to collecting 
additional information in the photographer’s hopes of certifying authenticity. However, image 
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authenticity ought to be provable regardless of the photographer's interest in doing so; indeed, 
provability can be more important when the photographer is suspected of falsification. 
A photo can be proven to have been taken before a certain time; for example, it was 
certainly taken before a viewer viewed it. It was also taken before the time it was uploaded (to a 
social-media, news, photo-sharing, or other site). It is also possible to use blockchain technology 
to prove that a photo was taken before a certain time [4]. 
Proving that photo was taken strictly after a particular time is trickier. A classic technique 
is to include a newspaper in the photo; the photo is then proven to be younger than the date of 
publication of the newspaper. A more modern version might be to include in the photo a 
smartphone with a newsfeed. The classic technique is not beyond manipulation; it is also 
inconvenient and impractical: the photographer has to expend effort to include in the original 
image an item (such as a newspaper) that proves its date. Spontaneous or candid photographs are 
not amenable to this technique. 
DESCRIPTION 
This disclosure describes techniques to prove the time and place of capture of a 
photograph. The techniques require no hardware other than that of a typical smartphone, nor do 
they rely on any trusted entity or expert to certify an image. 
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Proving time of image capture 
Fig. 1: Proving time of capture of an image 
Fig. 1 illustrates proving the time of capture of an image. An authenticity server (102) 
generates a timestamped, pseudorandom pattern (108). The pattern changes with time, and the 
frequency of its change can vary with the granularity with which the image is to be pinpointed in 
time. For example, the pseudorandom pattern can change once an hour, once a day, etc. A user 
with a camera (104) captures a photo (110). The photo and its metadata (EXIF) are hashed, e.g., 
labeled using a checksum operation, and the hash is uploaded to the authenticity server (112).  
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As illustrated in Fig. 2, the receipt of the hash by the authenticity server establishes a time 
T1 before which the photo was taken. The camera receives from the authenticity server the 
timestamped, pseudorandom pattern (114). The receipt of the pattern timestamped at T2
establishes a time after which the photo was taken. The pattern is uncontrollable by and a priori 
unknown to the user.  
At a time after receiving the pattern, the user captures an authentication video while 
moving the camera in accordance with the received pattern (116). For example, if the 
pseudorandom pattern was N-SW-E-NW-Up, then the user captures the video while sequentially 
pointing North, South-West, East, North-West, and up. The user can be guided in the camera 
movement by an augmented reality app that provides movement instructions in an easy and 
natural way. 
The camera optionally transmits the photo, its hash, and its authentication video 
(compressed as necessary) to the authenticity server (118). The authenticity server authenticates 
the timestamp of the photo (120) by verifying that the turns taken by the camera (movement of 
the camera) during the capture of the authenticating video accord with the timestamped, 
pseudorandom pattern. Verifying the turns within the authenticating video can be done using a 
machine learning model. For example, if all the objects in a video move to the right, then the 
camera was panned to the left. Also, it can be a requirement that objects in the photo appear at 
corresponding times and positions in the video, e.g., the video must be a continuation of the 
photo. One who wishes to falsify the photo, e.g., by adding or removing an object in the photo, 
must also do so in the video, which is a substantially more difficult task.  
The photo is shared, e.g., with a peer or via an image-sharing site (122) or other service. 
A viewer (106) of the image wishes to determine the authentic timestamp of the photo, and 
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queries the authenticity server (124) with a hash of the photo. Based on the concordance of the 
authentication video with the timestamped pseudorandom pattern it issued, the authenticity 
server has already established the authenticity of the timestamp of the photo corresponding to the 
hash. The authenticity server responds appropriately to the query (126). 
Fig. 2: Windowing the photograph between T1 and T2
Alternatively, upon receiving an authenticating query from a viewer, the authenticity 
server can release to the viewer the authentication video and the pseudorandom pattern at the 
time of image capture, enabling the viewer to determine the authentic timestamp of the image. If 
the photo and the authentication video haven’t been uploaded to the authenticity server, the 
photographer can release to the viewer the authentication video and, by downloading the 
pseudorandom sequence from the authenticity server at the claimed time of capture, the viewer 
can determine the authenticity of the timestamp of the image. 
The pseudorandom pattern can be a combination of camera tilt (up/down: 1 bit) and one 
of the eight compass directions (3 bits). The pattern can incorporate movements of greater 
precision with temporal variability, e.g., make a short stop in the third position in the pattern 
while moving smoothly from the fifth to the sixth position. 
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Fig. 3: Illustrating the number of movement possibilities for the authenticating video 
Fig. 3 illustrates an example matrix for the number of possible movement targets for the 
camera position during the take of the authenticating video. The user starts in the middle 
immediately after the photo is taken and follows the received pattern through three points in the 
circular matrix selected randomly, either stopping at them or not. This produces approximately 
(23 × 2)3 = 97,336 possible patterns, representable by about 16 bits. The probability of ending up 
with a correct pattern by just a coincidence is very low - 1÷97,336 ~ 0.001%.
The described techniques of timestamp authentication are generally applicable, e.g., for 
journalists taking photographs for public consumption, for a tenant documenting the state of an 
apartment just before accepting the keys, or for anyone else taking a photo of any significance. 
While smartphone cameras need no additional components to implement the described 
techniques, standalone cameras can either have their firmware updated to support the described 
techniques or be accompanied by a special-purpose device.  
If the hash of the photo and its authentication video are the only data uploaded to the 
authenticity server (rather than the actual photo and its authentication video), the amount of data 
exchanged is very small, perhaps a few bytes, comparable to the size of an SMS message. Such 
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data exchange can be completed even when the device is roaming or under poor network 
conditions. The publicly accessible aspects of the techniques, e.g., the authenticity server, are 
computationally inexpensive (since these are utilized only to generate pseudorandom patterns 
and authenticate submitted photos using well-known cryptographic techniques) and have low 
storage requirements (since these store only hashes). Raw images and videos can be stored 
elsewhere (e.g., on the capturing device, at an image-sharing or social media website, etc.) and 
retrieved for the purposes of verification. Alternative to the use of a machine learning model to 
verify that the camera movement follows a given pattern, expert humans can also do so 
manually. 
In this manner, demanding continuity of the photo in the video narrows the window of 
time of capture to minutes (or less, depending on the frequency of pattern generation). Obtaining 
a photo and near-simultaneously a video with specified camera movements makes image 
manipulation much harder. 
Proving place of image capture 
Fig. 4: Pinpointing a location of image capture [5]  
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As described in [5], an approach to proving the location of image capture is to have the 
camera accurately measure ping delays to one or more beacon stations, e.g., cell-phone towers. 
In practice, such a scheme requires that the computations and the beacon-camera interactions be 
completed in an unfeasibly tight window, e.g., microseconds. Also a problem with this approach 
is that image origin can be forged by having a proxy device in the target area, e.g., the VPN exit 
point. The techniques described herein harden the scheme of [5] by enabling the camera to 
include in the reply a random subset of pixels from the raw image. This dovetails nicely with 
recording a short authentication video after the capture of the image. 
Modes of attack 
While a determined photograph falsifier can, in theory, bypass the provable timestamp 
mechanism herein described, doing so is expensive and laborious. Falsifying T1, the time before 
which the photo was captured, entails the control of data storage, a task rendered very difficult 
by existing distributed database protocols. Falsifying T2, the time after which the photo was 
captured, can be attempted in the following ways: 
● The falsifier can try to control the pattern. This can be thwarted by making pattern 
generation open and verifiable (for which there are multiple ways), e.g., a given received 
pattern can be verified as being issued by the authenticity server. 
● The falsifier can try to predict the pattern, or wait until a specific pattern appears 
and publish a previously-taken photo at that time. Such an attempt at falsification is 
very time-consuming. For example, if the pattern is updated every 5 minutes and if there 
are 105 possible patterns, then a particular pattern repeats once every 105×5 minutes ≈ 
347 days. Additional factors such as visible weather conditions or time of the day in a 
photo make it even harder to attribute the photo to a particular date. Entangling the seed 
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with the image hash, e.g., by asking users to present a photo hash before giving a pattern 
(rather than simply broadcasting the pattern), makes brute force attempts visible. 
● The falsifier can try to capture photos in a way that enables them to post facto 
generate the required proof. For example, the falsifier can capture footage with 
multiple cameras from multiple possible angles, and stitch together the authentication 
video just after the pattern appears. While theoretically possible, such a technique is very 
expensive and substantially raises the bar for convincing forgery.  
Further to the descriptions above, a user may be provided with controls allowing the user 
to make an election as to both if and when systems, programs or features described herein may 
enable collection of user information (e.g., information about a user’s captured photos/videos, a 
user’s preferences, or a user’s current location), and if the user is sent content or communications 
from a server. In addition, certain data may be treated in one or more ways before it is stored or 
used, so that personally identifiable information is removed. For example, a user’s identity may 
be treated so that no personally identifiable information can be determined for the user, or a 
user’s geographic location may be generalized where location information is obtained (such as to 
a city, ZIP code, or state level), so that a particular location of a user cannot be determined. Thus, 
the user may have control over what information is collected about the user, how that 
information is used, and what information is provided to the user. 
CONCLUSION 
This disclosure describes techniques to prove the time and place of capture of a 
photograph. An authenticity server generates a timestamped, pseudorandom pattern. Upon 
capture of a photograph, the camera downloads the pattern and captures an authentication video 
while executing a sequence of movements corresponding to the pattern. The authentication video 
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can be used to authenticate the time of capture of the photograph by confirming that the camera 
moved in accordance with the timestamped, pseudorandom pattern. 
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